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Consider the apocalyptic premise and precautionary measures Bruce Ackerman 
proposes in “Before the Next Attack”. Terrible events will come in a form that makes “all 
comparison with September 11 pale”, he tells us, and the President will take precautions 
against a “second strike”. Ackerman knows that in the face of terrorism, the President, 
Congressional representatives, and a fearful public will unhesitatingly reverse discount. 
That is, they will sacrifice present civil liberty to reduce the risk of future death and 
destruction, picturing the next attack in catastrophic terms where the stakes are existential 
survival. Ackerman adds another element to this picture by predicting the “total 
implosion” of liberal democratic values and large-scale breakdown of the rule of law. He 
advocates protection against unchecked executive prerogative:
1 a statute that bolsters 
Congress’ institutional independence by giving Congress a device to limit unilateral 
presidential emergency power. The plan is formal and tied to constitutionally assigned 
responsibility: an initial declaration of emergency power that is time-limited, after which 
power lapses unless an escalating supermajority of votes in Congress continues the 
emergency regime.    2 
Ackerman’s statute has not been on Congress’s agenda for many reasons, not 
least because both present and future infringements on liberty are not randomly 
distributed but fall on predictably vulnerable groups. Massive detentions that threaten us 
all are hard to imagine; we displace the costs onto others.
2 Ackerman also proposes that 
every election should select a “vice-representative” to serve in the event of a decapitating 
strike on Congress. We won’t get that either;  Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein 
devote a chapter of The Broken Branch to leadership’s abdication of responsibility to 
sensibly insure institutional continuity.  
It is in this spirit that Sotorios Barber takes up the question “what is the best 
theory of the democratic responsibility of Congress?” He warns that “unlimited economic 
growth may be suicidal” and uses Congress’s inattention to global warming to illustrate 
political “immaturity”. Acting as sober agents for our future selves and for future others 
is part of what we mean by “grown up”, and as Congressman Dick Armey confessed, 
“the practice of politics too often takes the form of professional juvenile delinquency: 
short-sighted and self-centered.”
3  
I use these examples to underscore the tendency on the part of officials and 
commentators to swing back and forth between a myopic focus on the present and 
apocalyptic visions of future events that will change everything. Historically, the chief 
sources of eschatology were religion and philosophy, but except for “end of timers” and 
the rare Hegelian alert to the end of history, Americans don’t live in sacred time. Instead, 
we predict apocalyptic secular events. Apocalyptic thinking is as much an obstacle to 
responsible government, I argue, as the stubborn “presentism” of news and election 
cycles it is in reaction against.    3 
My theme is responsible Congress and the problem of political time. Consider 
four categories of political time: 
4 
·  News time. It is now instantaneous, incessant, often visually recorded, and 
every moment is archived so that each instant can be resurrected and 
replayed.   
·  Electoral time. In the U.S. elections are held at regular intervals. However, 
like the war on terror, political campaigns have become permanent, with 
the result that elected officials make and frame legislation  for strategic 
political purposes and literally spend less time on Congressional business.
5  
·  Historical time. This is the stretch of time in which we see and understand 
ourselves coherently. It comprises the narratives of American history and 
identity that we project into the national future. It is the time frame of 
responsible political action. 
·  Apocalyptic time.  Attention is riveted on some future event – certain, 
catastrophic, and irreversible -- that will change everything.  
 
Perhaps democracies do not think about and plan for the future well. The grip of 
news time and electoral time seems inexorable. Although “the welfare of our children and 
grandchildren” is frequently invoked during campaigns,  there are good political reasons 
why intergenerational sensitivity is mainly rhetorical. As Barber says, responsible 
democratic “guardians of interests” are politically accountable to voters who elect and 
sanction them, and who suffer from what has described as blind retrospection and 
unenlightened self-interest.
6 We could reasonably conclude that Congress’s   4 
preoccupation with the present and inaction with regard to the future reflects constituents’ 
preferences. Simply, the sanction of retrospective voting operates against imposing 
present costs on people to whom these burdens have not been persuasively justified. It 
turns out to be hard for men and women, personally and individually, to be good agents 
for their future selves (as in saving) much less for extensions of themselves (their 
children and grandchildren) and least of all for anonymous future generations. The 
obstacle is not just Publius’ “sudden breeze of passion or every transient impulse”, 
selfishness or complacency. It is also the limits of imagination about the future, absent a 
crisis that makes the need to take precautions and to pay present costs “cognitively 
available” and popularly desired.  
When crises are immediate and brought home to us, we see a swing to the 
opposite extreme. Politicians can be counted on to be “worst-case entrepreneurs” and to 
announce “one-percent” doctrines; that is Ackerman’s point. 9/11 enabled Congress to 
vote approval for the Patriot Act without reading the bill, and President Bush incessantly 
referred to the attacks and to the scenario of Saddam Hussein giving nuclear weapons to 
terrorists to arouse public support for the Iraq war. Cass Sunstein makes this point by 
contrasting  Congressional response to ozone levels with non-response to global 
warming. True, it was not very costly for industry to move away from aerosols but as 
important, the public could picture a “hole” in the “protective shield” and death from skin 
cancer. Photographs of melting polar caps do not make the impact of climate change on 
us personally and individually sufficiently concrete.
7 Similarly, the burden of high gas 
and oil costs is transient and diffuse, and not a dependable source of popular support for 
reformed energy policy. As a result, until recently the main recourse for stimulating and   5 
sustaining popular attention has been the apocalyptic prediction that global warming will 
kill us all. 
Barber is surely right to argue that part of democratic representatives’ 
responsibility, along with being guardians of the people’s interests, is to create a people  
that appreciates the need for disciplined political responsibility. (Or, as David Mayhew 
acidly remarked, we often seem to want a new people, not a new Congress.) If 
representatives succeed in the business of public education, then costly actions on behalf 
of future security and welfare not only care for the nation’s true interest but also reflect  
popular preferences. It is with this in mind that theorists of deliberative democracy 
experiment with randomly chosen “citizen juries” and other nonbinding deliberative 
arrangements. The idea is to provide the public and Congress with the results of popular 
decision-making that is informed, unbiased, nonpartisan, and the product of sustained 
deliberation. The expectation is that the unofficial decisions made by “citizen juries”  will 
be a much publicized and persuasive part of the mix of voices that seek to official 
decision-making: advocacy groups and self-styled public interest groups, news-time 
driven media, political parties, and corporate lobbying and campaign contributions 
directed at committee chairs and Congressional leaders in what is “widely viewed as a 
market for public policy”.
8 At present, news time and election time make elected officials 
vulnerable to constituents for whom danger is less “cognitively available” than costs. 
Indeed representatives may very well share their constituents’ preferences and beliefs, 
and their tendency to discount the future.  
Barber’s discussion of the constitutional foundation of responsible government 
does not acknowledge the problem of political time. Instead, his focus is the traditional   6 
problem of political space. He applauds the founders for designing institutions capable of 
producing ‘as nearly as possible right results’ on matters of common defense and general 
welfare. The political space of Congress in particular is constitutionally charged with 
deliberating, he tells us, and he identifies responsibility with deliberation. For Barber and 
political theorists generally, deliberation gives “public reasons” scope and rules out 
certain kinds of arguments and justifications. For Barber, it should make reasons 
grounded in experience and science, not authority, decisive.  
It goes without saying that when it comes to catastrophic future events, 
experience has limitations as a guide to precautions or discounting the future. The 
category of scientific reasons has meaning in contrast to religious authority, but otherwise 
it is an insufficient ground for deliberation by responsible agents for our future selves and 
for future others. The difficulty of translating science into policy remains. (Are you an 
enemy of science if you disagree with the Stern Report, adopted by the British 
Government?
9) So does the distinctive Congressional responsibility of translating policy 
into legislation. These are ineradicably political.  
I want to take just a moment to acknowledge the difficulty of care for the future 
even for scientists and economists who take on all the known difficulties of assessing 
uncertainty and risk but are free of political responsibility. Take the precautionary 
principle – it is normally interpreted to require reasonably foreseeable adverse impacts, 
but in a worst-case scenario are officials obligated to take action even before credible 
evidence is secure? How do we guard against the possibility that attention to one risk will 
produce aggressive actions (as in Iraq) that create enormous costs themselves? This 
dilemma plagues policy-making for the future beyond matters of security and global   7 
warming. In responding to the prospect of calamitous financial collapse, Congress 
“locked in full emergency mode, reacting and defending” has run up an enormous rescue 
tab; the danger as a New York Times editorial points out “is that in fighting today’s 
crises, the government is teeing up the next one…but frank acknowledgment of the 
dangers would put a premium on getting the rescues right today.”
10 What about 
discounting? Does intergenerational justice require neutrality between lives today and 
future lives such that “present generations are obliged to take the interests of their 
threatened descendents as seriously as they take their own”.
11 If so, what does that entail? 
Some argue that without discounting we will reduce economic growth and impose even 
greater burdens on future generations, making their lives worse off. There’s the 
countervailing observation that regulation creates innovation, decreasing the costs of 
controlling emissions, say. But there is also the possibility of ecological limits to growth 
regardless of innovation. Economists are less humble than moral philosophers (even 
today, December , 2008) but they are just as unlikely to agree on the correct discount rate 
for future scenarios.  
Scientists, ethicists, and economists can advise Congressional staffs, committees, 
and regulators on the choice of discount rate and its distributive effects or on an efficient 
“carbon price”. They can design policy and advocate for it. They publicize their positions 
in news and political time along with think tanks, organized interest groups, and 
lobbyists. Scientists, ethicists, and economists have to sell their expertise to a lay 
Congress, and members of Congressional committees must decide to put legislation to 
which these analyses and judgments apply on the agenda. Again, responsibility is not 
only a policy matter but also  a legislative matter.    8 
It is no overstatement to say that every challenge to a responsible Congress 
surveyed in these conference papers, every discouraging element of institutional 
dynamic, is compounded by the problem of political time. Legal scholars and political 
scientists have produced a long list of recent political obstacles to deliberation  -- ranging 
from partisan polarization that results in subordination to the President and weak 
oversight to decision rules that violate “regular order”, preclude majority/minority debate 
on committees and in conferences, and produce results that are neither amendable nor 
transparent and that fail to articulate costs. Against this background, obstacles to 
addressing problems with long-term and uncertain horizons of harm on the one hand and 
assignable costs today on the other are even more formidable.  
What are the distinctive obstacles political time poses to a responsible Congress? 
And what might encourage Congress, in the grip of news and electoral time, to attend to 
historical time and to think about the future concretely, in terms of reasonable precautions 
and discounting, and to put legislation for security and welfare on the agenda? Several 
inhibitions constrain Congress in assuming its charge of care for the future. I focus on the 
conditions of institutional responsibility, and only indirectly on representatives’ personal 
moral disposition to deliberate for the future.  
First, as Barber’s constitutional foundationalism reminds us, Congress’s 
responsibility is for national security and welfare. Global warming wreaks damage no 
matter where it is produced, and has many different environmental effects in different 
places. One political difficulty is that the national costs and benefits of programs to 
reduce the impact of carbon emissions, say, are not complementary. Large costs are 
projected to be borne by the U.S.. These costs, including financial assistance to poorer   9 
countries, may well be morally justified since we are a principal source of the stock of 
greenhouse cases and are comparatively rich, but the benefits of reducing global warming 
redound first of all to poor people in poor places. Thus, Thomas Schelling wrote that 
“greenhouse gas abatement is a foreign aid program…”,
12 and the Senate passed a 
unanimous, bipartisan resolution urging President Clinton not to sign the Kyoto 
Convention if it would injure the economic interests of the U.S. or if it failed to mandate 
scheduled commitments on the part of developing countries.  
There are countervailing forces to a national perspective, of course. Moral 
philosophers underscore environmentalism as a universal obligation and religious leaders 
speak in terms of stewardship of the earth, urging us to see that our true self-interest is 
inseparable from altruism.  Environmental advocates, too, operate in a moral key. The 
combination of apocalyptic terms in survival is at stake and moral terms of obligation to 
future generations and care of the earth are powerful, the sentiments widespread. 
Advocacy, lobbying, and the personal commitment of individual representatives could 
conceivably alter Congress’s sense of moral as well as practical urgency, and increase  
representatives’ appetite for enforceable international treaties. An empowered popular 
movement could expand presidential authority, as social movements typically do, and the 
executive could shift Congressional priorities by declaring, say, a Green New Deal. 
That said, legislative politics will not be guided by moral obligation alone, even if 
moral advocates are politically organized. For the constitutional structure of election 
cycles and constituency forcefully support “presentism”. The two year House term, the 
comparatively small size and homogeneity of House districts, and representation 
understood in terms of responsiveness to constituents’ demands, attention to special   10 
interests in the district, and provision of constituent services are all constraints. They are 
reflected in membership on specialized committees. Some differentials of Congressional 
conduct and policy can be explained by the Senate’s longer term, heterogeneous 
constituency, and internal rules designed to facilitate more talk (a truly latitudinarian 
view of deliberation!). I do not know of a study that addresses the question whether this 
differential in election time, constituency, and internal rules matters when it comes to 
agenda-setting and deliberation for the future.  
In short, the constraints of election time suggest that responsible governing would 
require altering public perception of the costs of reducing risk. The argument that 
developing a cheap way to control emissions is an opportunity for economic renewal, is 
one example; another is the promise of jobs from clean energy policy. We are now seeing 
this transition from the swing between presentism and apocalypse to historical time. Take 
Al Gore’s recent New York Times piece, “The Climate for Change”. The opening 
paragraphs point as expected to the “existential threat to the future of the human species”. 
But Gore goes on to bring the “good news” that immediate investment in a 5-point plan 
to solve the climate crisis will put people to work creating 21
st century technologies.
13  
The shift of focus from survival to jobs and investment is striking, and potentially 
politically enabling. Why? We could speculate that this shift is potentially effective 
because it directs attention from a catastrophe that is beyond voters’ ken, global warming,  
to another that is “cognitively available”, a once in a lifetime economic crisis. Or we 
could speculate that a focus on innovation is an emotionally welcome sea-change from 
fear to the more familiar mood of American optimism and self-congratulation on our 
potential for innovation and global leadership.   11 
The main point, however, is that putting global warming in the context of 
investment in technology and job-creation makes correcting green gas emissions 
distributive. It focuses representatives on the potential for parceling out costs and benefits 
among geographic constituencies. It invites Congress to link a legislative agenda to their 
voters and their districts in a politically salient way. It does not remove the inhibition of 
electoral time, but could help to make election time more congruent with historical time. 
It puts precautions and discounting in the context of a coherent narrative about national 
identity and values. 
That said, election time is not the optimum time frame if we want committed 
decision makers capable of being sensible consumers of expert calculations of 
precautions and discounts, which brings me to the third constraint. More than other 
aspects of Congressional business, responsibility for the future argues against term limits 
and suggests that incumbency and safe seats are not necessarily bad. Of course, 
entrenchment can serve interests adverse to responsible care for the future, but it also 
creates conditions for commitment to long-term legislative goals. There are advantages to 
experience and continuity in the composition of Congress, and re-election is not just self-
serving or partisan. On this view, the competitiveness of elections is not the sole value it 
sometimes seems to be for scholars of election law and democratic theory. Again, 
entrenched office-holders can be on the wrong side of history, but Congressional 
leadership that can match expertise with committee roles is a sine qua non of responsible 
care of the future.
14  
Finally, consider voting theory and election time. The leading retrospective 
account sees elections as sanctioning of representatives’ action (or inaction) during an   12 
election cycle. Another account of voting speaks to the problem of political time in more 
promising terms. Its expression in political science is the notion that elections are not 
only about sanctioning but also about selection of “good types” defined in terms of 
consistency, intrinsic ability and competence. These representatives act on constituents’ 
behalf independent of reelection incentives. James Fearon presents the advantages of a 
selection approach by showing that elections as sanctioning devices have limited ability 
to induce politicians to do what the (median constituent) voter wants done, in part 
because of information deficits that make monitoring difficult. He argues that selection is 
at least as good a mechanism for producing responsiveness.
 15 We see that elections 
understood as opportunities to select “good types” is even more important when it is a 
matter of doing what voters would or should want done by responsible representatives. 
Choosing “good types” speaks to Barber’s insistence that responsible government is not 
just a matter of institutional design but also of personal commitment to deliberating on 
security and welfare.  
If democracies are particularly bad at care for the future, we might ask what sort 
of government can we imagine doing a better job when it comes to precautions and 
discounting? Hereditary monarchy? Think of Henry V’s soliloquy ‘heavy lies the head 
that wears the crown’ about the king’s personal responsibility for England as his estate in 
Shakespeare’s play. But contemporary experience with proprietary rulers shows them to 
be predatory not precautionary. Political theorists laud civic republicanism; they invoke 
the Romans who valued future citizens as much as they did themselves. This account is 
not only idealized, in addition most versions of civic republicanism are parochial and 
inward-looking, not attentive to international politics and global problems.     13 
Let’s hope Congress can overcome the obstacles to responsibility for the future  
because if not democratic Congress, who? A nonpartisan “Commission for the Future”  
with responsibilities that reach far beyond the narrow ones of a districting commission? 
Courts? In an essay in this volume, Jack Beerman analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
instruction to the EPA that in implementing the Clean Air Act the agency should include 
the effects of global warming gasses. But the case turned on statutory construction, and it 
is not clear that Congress had that intent the Court attributed to the legislation. Some state 
and local governments have taken action on global warming on their own, which may put 
pressure on industry to alter technology and lower costs, and which could influence 
elected officials at the national level, but it still falls to Congress to legislate. The 
President? Barber’s theory of responsible government is only nominally about Congress; 
he asks whether “friends of responsible government would do better by conceding the 
case for presidential government”. Similarly, Mann and Ornstein too locate their hopes 
for Congressional renewal outside Congress -- in new presidential leadership that will 
alter the divisive institutional dynamics of Congress.
 16  
 With this, we come full circle : if inaction or delegation by Congress, or 
deference to the executive, or passing decisions off to courts is a derogation of 
constitutional responsibility for the future, what can make representatives take care? I’ve 
pointed to some of the key obstacles and to some enabling conditions: moral urgency, 
institutional design and political incentives in the form of distributional possibilities, and 
recasting elections from sanctioning devices alone to the selection of “good types”. 
Together they might loosen the grip of news and electoral time, lift the politically 
unhelpful cloud of apocalyptic time, and give  historical time its moment.    14 
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